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Abstract
As a result both of the way in which the external relations powers of the European Community
(“EC” or “Community”) have been organized by the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity (“EC Treaty”) and of the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Communities
(“ECJ”), an analysis of the evolution of the external relations powers requires distinguishing be-
tween powers relating to foreign trade in the strict sense of the terms, i.e., “common commercial
policy” under Article 113 of the EC Treaty, and other external relations powers both express and
implied. The subject of this contribution is the external relations powers of the Community. This
contribution does not deal with the external relations of the European Union (“EU” or “Union”) in
the area covered by the common foreign and security policy.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS POWERS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Jacques H.J. Bourgeois*
INTRODUCTION
As a result both of the way in which the external relations
powers of the European Community ("EC" or "Community")
have been organized by the Treaty establishing the European
Community1 ("EC Treaty") and of the interpretation by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities ("ECJ"), an analy-
sis of the evolution of the external relations powers requires dis-
tinguishing between powers relating to foreign trade in the strict
sense of the terms, i.e., "common commercial policy" under Arti-
cle 113 of the EC Treaty,2 and other external relations powers
both express and implied. The subject of this contribution is the
external relations powers of the Community. This contribution
does not deal with the external relations of the European Union
("EU" or "Union") in the area covered by the common foreign
and security policy.'
There is no Union and even if there was, it would have no
external relations powers. It is true that the absence of a treaty
provision granting legal personality is not conclusive under in-
ternational law.4 One can hardly by-pass the fact, however, that a
proposal tabled to that effect at the latest Intergovernmental
Conference was not carried. In view of the manifest intention of
the High Contracting Parties for the Union not to have interna-
* Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Brussels; Professor, College of Eu-
rope, Bruges.
1. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [here-
inafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
2. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113, O.J. C 224/1, at 44 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 656.
3. SeeTEU, supra note 1, tit. V, OJ. C 224/1, at 94-96 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
729-34 (Provisions on a common foreign and security policy).
4. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174 (Apr. 11) (advisory opinion).
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tional legal personality, there is no room for implied or inherent
international personality in the Union.
The Treaty of Amsterdam' (or "Amsterdam Treaty") has
nonetheless provided a certain innovation by inserting Article
J.14 into the Treaty on European Union ("TEU" or "Maastricht
Treaty") .6 First, the Amsterdam Treaty provides that the Council
of the European Union ("Council") may conclude international
agreements in implementation of Title V and Title VI.7 Second,
it provides that such agreements are not binding on a Member
State "whose representative in the Council states that it has to
comply with the requirements of its own constitutional proce-
dure," in which case "the other members of the Council may
agree that the agreement shall apply provisionally to them."8
Although new, in effect, this provision is no more than the ex-
tension in the area of external relations of the formula intro-
duced by the Maastricht Treaty9 whereby the Union is "served by
a single institutional framework,"1 ° without, however, altering
the intergovernmental nature of the common foreign and secur-
ity policy and the cooperation in the field of justice and home
affairs.1" It is doubtful whether this innovation will be wel-
comed. From an EC internal institutional perspective, it does
not add anything: the fact that the agreements as contemplated
would be concluded by the Council does not make them agree-
5. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C
340/1 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
6. See id. art. 1 (10), O.J. 340/1, at 15 (1997) (inserting art.J.14 into TEU); Consoli-
dated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 24, O.J. C 340/2, at 161 (1997), 37
I.L.M. 67, 73 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU] (art.J.14 of TEU), incor-
porating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5. By virtue of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, articles of the TEU will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the
Treaty on European Union. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79
(1997).
7. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5, art. 1(10), O.J, C 340/1, at 15 (1997)
(inserting art. J.14 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 6, art. 24, O.J. C 340/2, at
161 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 73 (art. J.14 of TEU).
8. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5, art: 1(10), O.J. C 340/1, at 15 (1997)
(inserting art. J.14 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 6, art. 24, OJ. C 340/2, at
161 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 73 (art. J.14 of TEU).
9. TEU, supra note 1, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719. The TEU is
popularly known as "Maastricht Treaty."
10. Id. art. C, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727.
11. See TEU, supra note 1, tit. VI, O.J. C 224/1, at 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 735-58 (Provisions on cooperation injustice and home affairs).
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ments concluded by the Community subject to the normal rules
of the EC Treaty. This type of agreement cannot be interpreted
by the ECJ and cannot be relied upon by private parties pursuant
to the case law of the ECJ. In relations with third countries, re-
course to this provision is bound to create confusion between
the Community and the Union.1"
This essay focuses on the foreign trade powers and on the
implied external relations powers, leaving aside the few other
express external relations powers.
I. FOREIGN TRADE POWERS
A. Legal Text
Most commentators agree that Article 113 of the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Economic Community13  ("EEC
Treaty"), which was and still is the key common commercial pol-
icy provision, has been poorly drafted. Article 113 of the EEC
did not, and Article 113 of the EC Treaty, as amended,' 4 still
does not define what is meant by commercial policy and it does
not generally define or exhaustively enumerate the instruments
to which the Community may have recourse to implement this
policy. As other EC Treaty provisions granting powers to the
12. See Christian W.A. Timmermans, Het Verdrag van Amsterdam. Enkele inleidende
kanttekeningen, 45 SEW 344, 346 (1997).
13. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113, at 60.
14. Article 113 of the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")
reads as follows:
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, par-
ticularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade
agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation ex-
port policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the
event of dumping or subsidies.
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing
the common commercial policy.
3. Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations
need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the
Council, which shall authorize the Commission to open the necessary negotia-
tions.
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a spe-
cial committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task
and within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it.
The relevant provisions of Article 228 shall apply.
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall
act by qualified majority.
EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 113, O.J. C 224/1, at 44 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 656.
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Community, Article 113 does not say anything about the rela-
tionship between these powers and Member States' powers; are
they parallel, concurrent, or exclusive? On the occasion of suc-
cessive amendments to the EC Treaty, the European Commis-
sion and the European Parliament put forward amendments to
Article 113, which failed to be adopted.
The Maastricht Treaty introduced two changes, which relate
to the exercise by the Community of its foreign trade policy pow-
ers, but do not deal with the scope of these powers. First, Article
113 of the EC Treaty now expressly refers to the amended Arti-
cle 228,15 which deals with the conclusion of international agree-
ments.16 Article 228(3) provides for consultation of the Euro-
pean Parliament, except for agreements referred to in Article
113(3), i.e., agreements in the field of foreign trade.' 7 Member
States obviously wanted, through the Council, to keep exclusive
control over such agreements.18 A foreign trade agreement "es-
tablishing a specific institutional framework by organizing coop-
eration procedures" or "having important budgetary implica-
tions for the Community," however, requires the assent of the
European Parliament.' 9 For instance, the conclusion of the
World Trade Organization Agreement 2° required the assent of
the European Parliament. As far as unilateral foreign trade pol-
icy measures are concerned, the European Commission under-
took in 1973 to recommend that the Council consult the Euro-
pean Parliament except in cases of urgency because of confiden-
tiality or for non-important matters.2 1 Second, as a result of the
new Article 228a, economic sanctions taking the form of trade
policy measures can only be taken after a common position or a
joint action has been adopted to that effect within the frame-
work of the common foreign and security policy, which means in
effect that unanimity is required.22
15. Id. art. 228, OJ. C 224/1, at 77 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 714-15.
16. Id. art. 113, .O.J. C 224/1, at 44 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 656.
17. Id. art. 228(3), O.J. C 224/1, at 77 (1992), [1992) 1 C.M.L.R. at 714.
18. See Alan Dashwood, Community Legislative Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on
European Union, 19 EUR. L. REv. 343, 344 (1994).
19. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228(3), O.J. C 224/1, at 77 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 714.
20. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
21. 6 E.C. BULL., no. 10, at 89-91, 2427 (1973).
22. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228a, O.J. C 224/1, at 78 (1992), [1992] 1
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In the course of the Intergovernmental Conference that
produced the Amsterdam Treaty, several proposals were put on
the table. At some point the amendments discussed took the
form of an amendment to Article 113 and a protocol to which
delegations wanted to add declarations. As negotiations
progressed, the set of texts became a Christmas tree with small
gifts for about every delegation. As a result, the amendment was
withdrawn. There remains only an additional paragraph five,
which provides: "The Council, acting unanimously on a propo-
sal from the Commission and after consultation with the Euro-
pean Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to
4 to international negotiations and agreements on services and
intellectual property as far as they are not covered by these
paragraphs. 23
This wording can only be read as recognizing that interna-
tional agreements on services and intellectual property come
within the scope of the common commercial policy. There are
several arguments to support this view. First, this provision is a
new paragraph to Article 113 of the EC Treaty, which itself ap-
pears under the title common commercial policy. 4 Its only ef-
fect is to require a unanimous decision of the Council for the
other parts of Article 113 to apply. Second, had the High Con-
tracting Parties considered similar agreements to be outside the
scope of the common commercial policy, they could hardly have
left it to the Council, even acting by unanimity, to extend the
scope of EC power. Third, had they taken that view, Article
113(5),25 added by the Amsterdam Treaty, was not necessary to
C.M.L.R. at 715. This formalizes a procedure that has been followed in the past. See,
e.g., Council Regulation No. 877/82, OJ. L 102/1 (1982) (establishing trade sanctions
against Argentina in Falklands war).
23. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5, art. 2(20), OJ. C 340/1, at 35 (1997) (ad-
ding art. 113(5) to EC Treaty); Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Community, art. 133(5), O.J. C 340/3, at 238 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, 99 (not yet
ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty] (art. 113(5) of EC Treaty), incorporating
changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam,
articles of the EC Treaty will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty
establishing the European Community. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra, art. 12, O.J. C
340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
24. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, tit. VII, O.J. C 224/1, at 44 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 655-57.
25. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5, art. 2(20), 9.J. C 340/1, at 35 (1992)
(adding art. 113(5) to EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 23, art. 133(5),
O.J. C 340/3 at 238, 37 I.L.M. at 99 (art. 113(5) of EC Treaty).
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allow the Community to enter into such agreements, recourse to
Article 23526 of the EC Treaty would have done the trick.
Two points should be noted. First, paragraph five only re-
fers to negotiations and agreements. Autonomous action in the
field of trade in services and international protection of intellec-
tual property rights remains subject to other EC Treaty provi-
sions. This requirement probably means that the new so-called
Trade Barriers Regulation 27 enacted under Article 113 still can-
not be applied in the field of trade in services and international
protection of intellectual property rights beyond the limits
within which Article 113 currently applies, as interpreted by the
ECJ in its Opinion 1/94 on the results of the Uruguay Round. 28
Second, it might be argued that the extension may be made on
an ad hoc basis only to certain types of services and intellectual
property rights, as opposed to their permanent subjection to Ar-
ticle 113.2 It may well be that certain Member States had this
argument in mind, but this interpretation does not find support
in the wording. If this interpretation had been the intention of
the Intergovernmental Conference, a wording similar to Article
235 would have been used along the lines of: "If, however, cer-
tain negotiations and agreements appear necessary ....
In constitutional terms as regards the relationship between
the Community and its Member States, Article 113(5) means
that the power to enter into international agreements in the
field of services and protection of intellectual property has been
transferred to the Community and forms part of the Commu-
nity's foreign trade policy powers. No further amendment to the
EC Treaty is required if the Community wants to act in these
fields. This transfer, however, is subject to a condition prece-
26. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 235, O.J. C 224/1, at 78 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 716.
27. Council Regulation No. 3286/94, O.J. L 349/71 (1994). For a comment, see
Marco C.E. Broncers, Enforcing WTO Law Through the EC Trade Barriers Regulation, 3
INT'L TRADE & REG. 76 (June 1997). Interestingly, the European Commission accepted
complaints and initiated investigations in relation to alleged obstacles to trade taking
the form of intellectual property measures. See, e.g., O.J. C 177/5 (1997) (IMRO com-
plaint about licensing of musical works in the United States).
28. Re the Uruguay Round Treaties, Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, [1995] 1
C.M.L.R. 205.
29. THE EUROPEAN POLICY CENTER, MAKING SENSE OF THE AMSTERDAM TREATY 97-98
(1997).
30. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 235, O.J. C 224/1, at 78 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 716.
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dent, i.e., a unanimous vote of the Member States in the Coun-
cil. Member States opposing the effective extension of the for-
eign trade policy powers to these fields have the right and the
political possibility to do so. They can, however, no longer use
the legal argument that these matters do not come within EC
powers and that EC measures in these fields would be opened to
legal challenge under national constitutional law.
B. Conflicting Views of EC Institutions
There have been several occasions in which conflicting
views about the interpretation of Article 113 arose between the
Council, or at least a number of Member States in the Council,
and the Commission. There were diverging views concerning
the sort of measures that could be taken under that provision.
Whether Article 113 also covers trade in services and intellectual
property became a real issue at the end of the Uruguay Round.
Discussions about whether this or that particular foreign
trade policy measure proposed by the Commission came within
EC powers under Article 113 usually arose because some Mem-
ber States considered that they could better defend their inter-
ests by acting on their own. Member States also reflected deeper
disagreements over the scope of these powers in general. From
a legal point of view, some Member States were concerned that,
once it was accepted that the Community had the power to take
the measure in question, it would be difficult to deny this power
in the future for similar measures. This position explains why,
for instance, the Council refused in the past to identify, in the
preamble of regulations on the EC General System of Prefer-
ences, the operative provision of the EC Treaty. One should
bear in mind that when acting under Article 113, the Council
may decide by qualified majority. This ability also explains why
there have been cases in which the Council rested its decisions
on Article 235,31 either alone or in conjunction with Article 113.
Relying on Article 235 had the added advantage of making clear
31. Article 235 of the EC Treaty reads as follows:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, act-
ing unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 235, OJ. C 224/1, at 78 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 716.
1999] S155
S156 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:$149
that the measures adopted were not, or not entirely, covered by
the Community's foreign trade policy powers.
The issue of the scope of the Community's foreign trade
policy powers cannot be separated from the interpretation of the
ECJ according to which these powers are exclusive. The
broader the scope of EC powers, the narrower the scope for
Member States to act on their own in this field.
At some point, in an attempt to put an end to endless de-
bates, the Council lawyers developed what came to be called the
"finalist theory," according to which any measure that aims to
influence the volume or flow of trade is to be considered as a
measure coming within the scope of Article 113. The Commis-
sion objected to this theory on the ground that it is not easy to
determine what is meant by the aims and that the aim pursued
by those responsible for the measure cannot be a proper crite-
rion to define the scope of their powers. The Commission devel-
oped its own theory according to which a measure of commer-
cial policy must be assessed, primarily by reference to its specific
character as an instrument regulating international trade. This
theory came to be called the "instrumentalist theory." The re-
spective theories of the Commission and Council are set out in
Opinion 1/78.3  In this opinion and in subsequent opinions
and judgments, the ECJ refrained from endorsing either theory.
C. Case Law Before Opinion 1/94
Not surprisingly, private parties involved in litigation in na-
tional courts used arguments about the interpretation of Article
113 that led these courts to refer questions of interpretation to
the ECJ. Disputes between the Commission and the Council
about the interpretation of Article 113 also ended up in the ECJ
in the form of either requests for advisory opinions under Article
228 or applications for the annulment of Council legal actions
32. Re the O.E.C.D. Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, Opinion 1/75,
[1975] E.C.R. 1355, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 85; see Donckerwolcke v. Procureur de la Repub-
lique, Case 41/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1921, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 535 (following Opinion 1/
75); Bulk Oil (Zug) v. Sun Int'l Ltd. & Sun Oil Trading Co., Case 174/84, [1986] E.C.R.
559, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 732 (following Opinion 1/75).
33. Re the Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber, Opinion 1/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 2871, 2880-94, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 639, 646-61. For a critique of both
theories, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Scope of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, in ETUDES
DE DROIT DES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPIEENNES: MLLANGES OFFERTS A PIERRE-HENRI
TEITGEN 145 (1984).
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brought by the Commission under Article 173.34
As already indicated, the ECJ has avoided espousing the
Commission or the Council theory and has not developed a the-
ory of its own. In the period prior to Opinion 1/94, during
which, it should be stressed, the ECJ was only asked to interpret
Article 113 with respect to trade in goods, the ECJ took a broad
view of the scope of EC powers. The ECJ has significantly con-
tributed to defining the scope of Article 113.
The ECJ held that certain measures, which are not specifi-
cally mentioned in Article 113, came within the scope of this
provision. These measures included "the elimination of national
disparities, whether in the field of taxation or of commerce af-
fecting trade with third countries, '' 5 customs valuation,3 6 an in-
ternational agreement on export credits," an international com-
modity agreement, 38 the EC System of Generalized Prefer-
ences, 39 the application of internal indirect taxes on goods
imported from third countries, 40 and measures taken at the ex-
ternal border of the Community to protect human health.41
The ECJ also broadly interpreted secondary legislation en-
acted under Article 113. For instance, the EC regulations on im-
port and export regimes that define the liberalization of imports
into the Community and exports from the Community as "not
subject to quantitative restrictions '42 were held to prohibit meas-
ures other than quotas, which in intra-Community trade are
called "measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restric-
tions."43 While such a broad interpretation makes sense and is
34. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173, O.J. C 224/1, at 62 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 687-88.
35. Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. N.V. Indiamex and Association de
fait De Belder, Joined Cases 37-38/73, [1973] E.C.R. 1609.
36. Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson GmbH, Case 8/73, [1973]
E.C.R. 897.
37. Opinion 1/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1355, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 85.
38. Opinion 1/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2871, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 639.
39. Commission v. Council, Case 45/86, [1987] E.C.R. 1493, [1988], 2 C.M.L.R.
131.
40. Co-Frutta Sfrl v. E.C. Commission, Case 191/88, [1988] E.C.R. 4551, [1990] 2
C.M.L.R. 372.
41. Hellenic Republic v. Council, Case C-62/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1527, [1991] 2
C.M.L.R. 649.
42. Council Regulation No. 3285/94, O.J. L 349/53, at 55 (1994); Council Regula-
tion No. 519/94, O.J. L 67/89 (1994) (applying to state trading countries); Council
Regulation No. 2603/69, OJ. L 324/25 (1969) (establishing common rules for export).
43. Commission v. Greece, Case C-65/91, [1992] E.C.R. 1-5245; Fritz Werner In-
S1571999]
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justified in light of the system and the purpose of these regula-
tions, the ECJ could conceivably have interpreted these more
narrowly on the basis of their wording.
Among the reasons on which it rested these broad interpre-
tations of EC powers under Article 113, the ECJ opined that
"policy" based on "uniform principles" and the non-exhaustive
enumeration in Article 113 of the EC Treaty of the subjects cov-
ered by commercial policy show "that the question of external
trade must be governed from a wide point of view" and that it
does not "close the door to the application in a Community con-
text of any other process intended to regulate external trade.""
The ECJ also developed some criteria: "the proper func-
tioning of the customs union;"" the concept of commercial pol-
icy, which has "the same content whether it is applied in the con-
text of the international action of a State or to that of the Com-
munity;"4 6 and Article 110,47 listing as it does, the objectives for
the aim of contributions to the harmonious development of
world trade presupposing that commercial policy will be ad-
justed to take account of any changes of outlook in international
relations.48
The ECJ has also set forth two principles on which the inter-
pretation of Article 113 should be based. The first principle
could be called the principle of coherence: "a coherent com-
mercial policy would no longer be practicable if the Community
were not in a position to exercise its powers also in connection
with a category of agreements which are becoming, alongside
traditional commercial agreements, one of the major factors in
the regulation of international trade."49 The second principle is
the principle of freedom of intra-EC trade: "a restrictive inter-
dustrie-Ausrhstungen GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C-70/94, [1995]
E.C.R. 1-3189; Criminal Proceedings Against Peter Lefier and Others, Case C-83/94,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-3231.
44. Opinion 1/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2871, 2913, 1 45, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 639, 677.
45. Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v. Massey-Ferguson GmbH, Case 8/73, [1973]
E.C.R. 897, 908, 1 4.
46. Opinion 1/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1355, 1362, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 85, 92; see Com-
mission v. Council, Case 45/86, [1987] E.C.R. 1493, 1503, 1 16, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 131,
136.
47. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 110, O.J. C 224/1, at 44 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 655.
48. Commission v. Council, [1987] E.C.R. at 1521, 1 19, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. at 154.
49. See Opinion 1/78, [1979] E.C.R. at 2912, 1 43, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 676; see
also Massey-Ferguson, [1973] E.C.R. at 908, 1 4.
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pretation of the concept of common commercial policy would
risk causing disturbances in intra-Community trade by reason of
the disparities which would then exist in certain sectors of eco-
nomic relations with non-member countries.
5°
D. Opinion 1/94
Towards the end of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, in which the Community had negotiated as
a unit following the established EC procedures" for all matters
including trade in services and trade-related intellectual prop-
erty measures, the question had to be faced as to whether the
Community had the power to conclude several agreements that
it had negotiated. This event was to be a cronica de una muerte
anunciada.2 From the outset, several Member States opposed
the Commission's view that the whole of the agreements fell
within the scope of the EC foreign trade policy powers under
Article 113 of the EC Treaty, alternatively that the General
Agreement on Trade in Services53 ("GATS") and the Agreement
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights54
("TRIPs Agreement") fell under the implicit external relations
powers. The issue of the Community's power remained un-
resolved at the end of the Uruguay Round. At a Council of the
European Union meeting of March 1994, Member States took
the view that the Final Act and the WTO Agreement "also
cover[ed] matters of national competence"5 while the Commis-
sion asserted that "the Final Act... and the agreements annexed
thereto [fell] exclusively within the competence of the European
50. Opinion 1/78, [1979] E.C.R. 2871, 2913, 45, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 639, 677.
51. See Pieter Jan Kuijper, The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round
Results by the European Community, 6 EUR.J. INT'L L. 222 (1995); Peter Van den Bossche,
The European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements: Confusion and Controversy over
the Competence and Conduct of the European Community in International Economic Relations:
The Bittersweet Experience of the Uruguay Round, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 23-
102 (John H. Jackson & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
52. GABRIEL GARciA MARQUEZ, CRONICA DE UNA MUERTE ANNUNGIADA (1984).
53. General Agreement of Trade in Services, in Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTs-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
54. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
55. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, 1-5267, 5, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205, 309.
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Community. "56 On April 6, 1994, the Commission submitted to
the ECJ a request for an advisory opinion with a view to ob-
taining a definitive ruling on the matter.
As far as the powers of the Community under Article 113 of
the EC Treaty are concerned, in its Opinion 1/94,"7 the ECJ re-
plied to the Commission's questions as follows:
* the Community has exclusive competence to conclude
the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods,5" includ-
ing the Agreement on Agriculture, 9 and also with respect
to goods subject to the Euratom Treaty6° and the ECSC
Treaty;
6 1
* cross-frontier supplies of services are covered by Article
113, excluding international agreements in the field of
transport services;62 and
* only the clauses in the TRIPs Agreement concerning the
release into free circulation of counterfeit goods fall
within the scope of the common commercial policy.
6 3
Opinion 1/94 has led to a flurry of comments in the literature.6 4
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1-5399, 34, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 313.
59. Id. at 1-5397-98, 29, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 313.
60. Id. at 1-5396, 24, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 312.
61. Id. at 1-5396-97, 27, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 313.
62. Id. at 1-5404, 53, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 318.
63. Id. at 1-5409, 71, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 322.
64. See, e.g., Josiane Auvret-Finck, Avis 1/94 de la Cour du 15 novembre 1994, 31 RE-
VUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPtEN 322 (1995); Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in
the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
763 (1995); Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochhre, L 're des CompJtences Partagies: A Propos de
L'tendue des Compitences Extbrieures de la Communauti Europienne, 390 REVUE DU MARCHk
COMMUN 461 (1995); Alan Dashwood, The Limits of European Community Powers, 21 EUR.
L. REv. 113 (1996); Nicholas Emiliou, The Death of Exclusive Competence?, 21 EUR. L. REv.
294 (1996); Thi~baut Flory & Frhdhric-Paul Martin, Remarques d propos des Avis 1/94 et 2/
92 de la Cour dejustice des Communautis europiennes au Regard de l'Evolution de la Notion de
Politique Commerciale Commune, 32 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPtEN 379 (1996); Meinhard
Hilf, The ECJ's Opinion 1/94 on the WTO - No Surprise, but Wise?, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 245
(1995); Jan H. Jans, Note on Opinion 2/92 and 1/94, (44) SEW 110 (1996); Denys
Simon, La compitence de la Communauti pour conclure l'accord OMC: 1'Avis 1/94 de la Cour
de Justice (1994) EUROPE, (December issue); G. Tognazzi, I1 Parere n' 1/94: nuovi
sviluppi in tema di relazioni esterne della Comunitd Europea 35 Din. COMUN. & SCAMBI. IN-
TERN. 75 (1996); F. Zampini, Les limites de la compitence externe de la Communautg
europienne selon la CJCE et les limites de rintervention judiciaire, in LA COMMUNAUTE
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There is no need to restate them here. Only a few points need
to be made.
It is worth mentioning that Opinion 1/94 put an end to a
number of uncertainties that led to recurrent discussions: the
Community has the power under Article 113 to enter into inter-
national agreements including international agreements on
products falling under the Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community, international agreements on trade
in agricultural products, international' agreements such as the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures65 and
the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,6 6 and in-
ternational agreements on cross-border supply of services. Opin-
ion 1/94 should also put an end to the practice of having Mem-
ber States appear alongside the Community as parties to certain
international commodity agreements or, at least, deprive Mem-
ber States of legal arguments in support of that practice, on the
ground that they pay part of the administrative expenses.
Opinion 1/94 is a step back as regards the rationale that the
ECJ developed in the past when defining the scope of the Com-
munity's foreign trade policy powers. In Opinion 1/94, the ECJ
recalls that changes in the international economy are relevant
for the interpretation of the scope of the powers under Article
113, as it stated in Opinion 1/78. Yet, the ECJ sets this criterion
aside with respect to intellectual property and services by refer-
ring to the division of powers and the decision-making proce-
dures foro interno under the EC Treaty. The ECJ also departs
from other principles and criteria referred to above on which it
relied in the past to define the scope of the Community's for-
eign trade powers under Article 113, such as the concept of com-
mercial policy within the meaning of Article 113, which should
have the same content as that of commercial policy of a State, or
the principle that the Community's foreign trade powers should
EUROPFkENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES. QUELLES PERSPECrIVES? 27 (Jacques H. Bourgeois
et al. eds., 1997).
65. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 48, reprinted in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
66. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
supra note 48, Annex 1A, reprinted in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter Technical Barriers Agreement].
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extend to agreements that are becoming major factors in the
regulation of international trade.
II. IMPLICIT EXTERNAL RELATIONS POWERS
A. The Issue
The common market established by the EEC Treaty, the
policies conducted under this treaty, and the amendments to
this treaty cover a broad range of activities entrusted to the Com-
munity. Yet, the constitutional provisions display a sort of myo-
pia by focusing on the intra-EC aspects of the policies, as if such
policies could be conducted in the intra-Community sphere by
the Community while leaving the extra-Community aspects to be
dealt with by Member States.
Apart from its Article 113, the EC Treaty conferred on the
Community an express power to enter into international agree-
ments in Article 238 of the EEC Treaty, with a view to conclude
agreements that establish an association with other countries or
international organizations.67 Subsequently, the 1986 Single Eu-
ropean Act 68 inserted into the EEC Treaty a provision conferring
on the EEC external relations powers in the field of capital
movements 69 and provisions conferring on the EEC the power to
enter into agreements with non-EC countries on research and
development programs and on environment.7" The Maastricht
Treaty inserted two provisions on international agreements into
the framework of the economic and monetary union and devel-
opment cooperation.71
The Amsterdam Treaty conferred on the Community addi-
tional external relations powers on matters of visa and asylum
67. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 238, at 90.
68. SEA, supra note 1, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
69. Id. art. 20, O.J. L 169/1, at 8 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 750 (amending
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty") by adding art.
102a).
70. Id. art. 24, O.J. L 169/1, at 11 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 752 (amending
EEC Treaty by adding art. 130n, provisions on research and development); id. art. 25,
0.J. L 169/1, at 11 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 754 (amending EEC Treaty by adding
art. 130r, provisions on environment).
71. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 109(4), 0.J. C 224/1, at 38 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 644 (Provisions on economic and monetary union); id. art. 130y, 0.J. C
224/1, at 54 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 673 (Provisions on development coopera-
tion).
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policies,7 2 but the so-called ERTA effect73 of internal EC rules on
external relations powers is excluded by the Protocol Relating to
Article 73j (2) (a) .71 In addition, the Declaration Relating to Arti-
cle 73k(3) (a) exists.75 Significantly, the Maastricht Treaty left
questions about external relations with respect to the Economic
and Monetary Union unresolved. For example, should a distinc-
tion be made between economic policy and monetary policy?
How will the Community be represented in the International
Monetary Fund? How should the position of EC Member States
to stay out of the Monetary Union be dealt with? These ques-
tions were not addressed by the Amsterdam Treaty either.76
Even with these subsequent additions, the constitutional provi-
sions do not address important parts of the external face of the
single market.
The same myopia is often displayed by the drafters of secon-
dary EC legislation, in particular when harmonizing Member
States' legislation. Directives such as those dealing with the dis-
closure requirements for branches of non-EC companies,77 the
position of non-EC financial institutions78 or non-EC insurance
companies, 7 9 or on requirements for non-EC providers of invest-
72. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5, art. 2(15)b, O.J. C 340/1, at 28-32
(1997) (inserting tit. Ila into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 23, tit.
IV, O.J. C 340/3, at 200-05 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 89-91 (tit. IlIa of EC Treaty).
73. See Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263 (ERTA) (holding
that implied powers of Community to act in external affairs can be derived from actuali-
zation of EC competence in internal affairs in that area).
74. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 5, Protocol on external relation of the Mem-
ber States with regard to the crossing of external borders, O.J. C 340/1, at 108 (1997).
75. Id., Declaration on Article 73k(3) (a) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, Oj. C 340/1, at 134 (1997).
76. For an analysis, see Jean-Victor Louis, Union mongtaire eurapenne et Fonds moni-
taire international, WAHRUNG UND WIRTscHAFr. DAS GELD IM RECHT: FESTScHRFr FUER
HUGO J. HAHN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 201 (Albrecht Weber ed., 1997).
77. Eleventh Directive of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements
in respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of companies gov-
erned by the law of another State, § II, O.J. L 395/36, at 38 (1989).
78. Second Council Directive No. 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the coordina-
tion of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and
pursuit of the business of credit institutions, tit. III, O.J. L 386/1, at 5-6 (1989).
79. Council Directive No. 90/619 of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws,
regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life insurance laying down
provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services, art. 8, O.J. L
330/50, at 54 (1990).
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ment services in the securities field,80 are the exception rather
than the rule.
Short of inserting into the EC Treaty provisions making
clear that EC powers in various areas include the power to deal
with the extra-EC aspects of these areas, there are essentially
three ways. to enable the Community to act in the international
sphere. One is to rely on Article 235, according to which appro-
priate measures may be taken by the Council acting unani-
mously and after consulting the European Parliament where
such measures are necessary to attain one of the EC objectives
and the EC Treaty does not provide the necessary powers. Sev-
eral cases followed this approach.8 1 The second and third ways
are to interpret sensibly the relevant EC Treaty provisions to that
effect. As Article 113 of the EC Treaty does not define the scope
of the common commercial policy, one could interpret this arti-
cle as covering the external face not only of the customs union,
i.e., trade in goods, but also of the other areas of the common
market.82 The Commission defended this interpretation in its
request for an advisory opinion on the Uruguay Round. As al-
ready indicated, the ECJ rejected the broad interpretation cover-
ing GATS and the TRIPs Agreement.
80. Council Directive No. 93/22 of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the se-
curities field, art. 7, O.J. L 141/27, at 34 (1993).
81. See, e.g., Decision of the Council and the Commission concerning the conclu-
sion of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the
United States of America regarding the application of their competition laws, OJ. L
95/47 (1995); Council Regulation No. 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to
accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, O.J. L 189/1 (1996); Council and Commission Decision on
the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of
the other part, O.J. L 327/1 (1997).
82. Position defended partly with qualifications in the literature, i.e., by ALBERT
BLECKMANN, EUROPARECHT: DAs RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT
461-462 (1985); Paul Demaret, La politique commerciale: Perspectives d'ovolution et faiblesses
prisentes, in STRUCTURE AND DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY 69 (Juegen
Schwarze & Henry. G. Schermers eds., 1988); PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL
MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1994); Georges Le Tallec, The
Common Commercial Policy of the EEC, 20 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 732 (1971); Pierre Pes-
catore, La Politique Commerciale, in LES NOVELLES: DROIT DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPtEN-
NES 921-922 (Ganshof van der Meersch ed., 1969); P. WEISSENBERG, DIE KOMPETENZ DER
EUROPA SCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSSGEMEINSCHAFT ZUM ABSCHLUSS VON HANDELS- UND KOOPER-
ATIONSABKOMMEN GEMASS ARTIKEL 113 EWG-VERTRAG (Berlin 1978).
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B. Implied External Powers
The other way to enable the Community to act in the inter-
national sphere is to deduce from the power to deal with a given
subject matter in intra-Community trade, the power to deal with
that matter in extra-Community trade. This approach has been
followed by the ECJ in ERTA, 3 in which the ECJ expounded a
doctrine that is often described as recognizing that the Commu-
nity's external powers are co-extensive with its internal powers in
foro interno, inforo externo. In fact, the doctrine is somewhat more
complicated. So much so that there are divergent views among
commentators as to how exactly it should be interpreted and ap-
plied.84
In ERTA,85 the issue submitted to the ECJ was whether the
European Economic Community or the Member States had the
power to conclude an international agreement called the Euro-
pean Agreement concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles en-
gaged in International Road Transport.86 The ECJ held that the
power to enter into international agreements,
may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and
from measures adopted, within the framework of these provi-
sions, by the Community institutions .... In particular, each
time the Community, with a view to implementing a common
policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down
common rules, whatever form they may take, the Member
States no longer have the right, acting individually or collec-
tively, to undertake obligations which affect those rules.8 7
Several points should be made. First, in ERTA and in subse-
quent cases, 88 the ECJ distinguishes between the existence of im-
plied external EC powers and the preemptive effect on Member
States' powers. In ERTA, the test was whether international obli-
gations undertaken by Member States would affect EC rules or
alter the scope of such rules.89 In Kramer, the ECJ held that be-
83. Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, [1971] E.C.R. 263 [hereinafter ERTA].
84. Meinhard Hilf, The Single European Act and 1992: Legal Implications for Third
Countries, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 89, 95 (1990).
85. ERTA, [1971] E.C.R. 263.
86. Id. at 265.
87. ERTA, [1971] E.C.R. at 274, 16-17.
88. Kramer and Bais SNC v. The Netherlands, Joined Cases 3, 4, 6/76, [1976]
E.C.R. 1279, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 440 [hereinafter Kramer].
89. ERTA, [1971] E.C.R. at 275, 22.
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cause at the relevant time the EEC had not yet fully exercised its
functions in fisheries conservation, Member States were still enti-
tled to conclude international agreements in that field.9 °
Second, as the existence of external powers under this doc-
trine is derived from common rules, the ECJ analyzes to what
extent common rules cover the same subject matter as the inter-
national agreement. For example, in Opinion 2/9191 relating to
the Community's powers to conclude Convention 170 of the In-
ternational Labor Organization ("ILO"), the ECJ rejected the
Commission's view that the Community's power in the field of
health conferred by Article 118a9 2 was exclusive. Instead, the
ECJ noted that both the International Labor Organization Con-
vention (the "ILO Convention") and Article 118a(3) only pro-
vide for minimum requirements and that the ILO Convention
and EC rules based on Article 118a(3) could always be applied
simultaneously. If the Community adopts rules that are less
stringent than the ILO Convention, EC Member States may,
under Article 118a(3), adopt more stringent measures. If the
Community adopts rules that are more stringent than the ILO
Convention, the ILO Convention would not prevent Member
States from applying these EC rules, because under the ILO con-
stitution Members may adopt more stringent rules.93
As a third point, one should mention Opinion 1/76 relating
to a draft international agreement establishing a laying-up fund
for inland waterway vessels.94 The ECJ noted that under Articles
74 and 75 of the EEC Treaty,95 to attain the common transport
policy, the Council is empowered to lay down any other provi-
sion. Recalling Kramer,96 the ECJ was of the view that the Com-
munity had authority to enter into international agreements in
cases in which internal power has already been used. It added
that this authority is not limited to that eventuality by stating that
"the power to bind the Community vis-A-vis third countries ...
flows by implication from the provisions of the Treaty creating
90. Kramer, [1976] E.C.R. at 1310, 35-39, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 469-70, 16-17.
91. Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1061, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 800.
92. SEA, supra note 1, art. 21, OJ. L 169/1, at 9 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 750
(amending EEC Treaty by adding art. 118a).
93. See Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. at 1-1079, 18, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. at 806.
94. Opinion 1/76, [1977] E.C.R. 741, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 279.
95. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 74-75, at 44-45.
96. Kramer and Bais SNC v. The Netherlands, Joined Cases 3, 4, 6/76, [1976]
E.C.R. 1279, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 440.
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the internal power and insofar as the participation of the Com-
munity in the international agreement is, as here, necessary for
the attainment of one of the objectives of the Community. '' 97
In situations contemplated by Opinion 1/76, there is obvi-
ously no preemptive effect resulting from the existence of the
EC external power. Consequently, this power is often referred
to as "potential" external power. As it is up to the Council to
assess whether the conclusion by the Community of an interna-
tional agreement is necessary, the likelihood that Member States
would agree in the Council to similar conclusions should not be
rated very high.
C. Opinion 1/94
In its request for an ECJ opinion, the Commission put the
implied external powers doctrine of ERTA and Opinion 1/76
forward as an alternative authority for the Community to con-
clude on its own GATS and TRIPs. The ECJ was of the view that
the application of Opinion 1/76 to GATS cannot be accepted."
Instead, the ECJ interpreted its Opinion 1/76 by distinguishing
it on the facts from the GATS case:
[t]hat is not the situation in the sphere of services: attain-
ment of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide
services for nationals of the Member States is not inextricably
linked to the treatment to be afforded in the Community to
nationals of non-member countries to nationals of Member
States of the Community.99
As to the TRIPs Agreement, the ECJ also dismissed the
Commission's argument based on Opinion 1/76:
The relevance of the reference to Opinion 1/76 is just as dis-
putable in the case of TRIPs as in the case of GATS: unifica-
tion or harmonization of intellectual property rights in the
Community context does not necessarily have to be accompa-
nied by agreements with non-member countries in order to
be effective.100
Most commentators think that Opinion 1/94 is a step back
97. Opinion 1/76, [1977] E.C.R. at 755, 4, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. at 295-96 (empha-
sis added).
98. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, 1-5413, 84, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205, 324.
99. Id. at 1-5414, 1 86, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 325.
100. Id. at 1-5417, 1 100, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 327.
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from the implied external powers as defined in Opinion 1/76.1"1
The "necessity test" in Opinion 1/74 meant in Opinion 1/94
that the attainment of an objective of the EC Treaty in the inter-
nal sphere must be inextricably linked to the external action.
Even then, in reply to Commission arguments tending to show
that this was the case in the transport sector, the ECJ added a
"proportionality test": "There is nothing in the Treaty which
prevents the institutions from arranging, in the common rules
laid down by them, concerted action in relations to non-member
countries or from prescribing the approach to be taken by the
Member States in their external dealings. 10 2
As far as the ERTA doctrine is concerned, the ECJ recalled
that notwithstanding the absence of an express reference to that
effect in the EC Treaty, the Community may use the powers con-
ferred to it with respect to the right of establishment and the
freedom to provide services to specify the treatment that is to be
accorded to nationals of non-member countries.10 3 It should be
noted, however, that the ECJ, perhaps as a result of the Commis-
sion's argument about exclusive power, did not treat two distinct
issues separately, i.e., whether the Community has the power to
enter into GATS and TRIPs and whether that power is exclu-
sive.104 They concluded that "competence to conclude GATS is
shared between the Community and the Members States ''1 °5 and
that "the Community and its Member States are jointly compe-
tent to conclude TRIPs. 10 6
It is unclear what the ECJ exactly meant by this formula. It
could mean that the Community and the Member States have
concurrent powers. It could also mean that the Community only
has power if the power is exclusive under the ERTA doctrine. If
the latter interpretation is correct, then the ECJ would have fur-
ther reduced the scope of its earlier case law.
The ECJ reiterated the requirement that in order to acquire
101. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Advocate General G. Tesauro re-
ferred in his opinion in Herms International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV (not yet re-
ported) to "the new reading of Opinion 1/76, reducing its scope to the specificity of
the case at hand, without however offering many explanations."
102. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5411-12, 1 79, [1995) 1 C.M.L.R. at 323.
103. Id. at 1-5415, 1 90, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 325.
104. See Opinion 2/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-1061, 1-1079, 11 13 et seq., [1993] 3
C.M.L.R. at 805 (discussing ILO Convention).
105. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5417, 1 98, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 327.
106. Id. at 1-5419, 105, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
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exclusive external power, common rules could be affected within
the meaning of ERTA if Member States retained freedom to ne-
gotiate with non-member countries. The ECJ, however, tight-
ened the ERTA doctrine by adding that this requirement implies
that the Community has achieved complete harmonization,
which was only the case for the rules governing access to a self-
employed activity.1 "7 The ECJ came to a similar conclusion with
respect to the TRIPs Agreement. 10 8
III. SOME COMMENTS
The law of the Community's external relations has signifi-
cant constitutional implications that have to do with the Com-
munity's institutional system and the division of powers between
the Community and its Member States. To that extent, it is to be
expected that when dealing with constitutional cases, the ECJ's
approach reflects the Zeitgeist. It is thus not surprising that there
is some ebb and flow in the case law and that it is currently at a
low water mark as seen from an integrationist perspective.
Opinion 1/94 offers a good example of where the ECJ was
faced with constitutional implications. The ECJ referred to such
implications in relation to the TRIPs Agreement, where it stated
that if the Community were to be recognized as having exclusive
external power, "the Community institutions would be able to
escape the internal constraints to which they are subject in rela-
tion to procedures and rules of voting." 109 It must have had this
statement also in mind when dealing with the question of GATS.
The ECJ could conceivably have reached a different conclusion.
Under Article 228(3) of the EC Treaty, the European Parliament
has to give its assent to the conclusion of the wTO Agree-
ment." 0 Certain important implementing measures are to be
taken on the basis of other EC Treaty provisions involving the
European Parliament in the decision-making process. In addi-
tion, practically all the rules as to voting that the EC institutions
would have been able to escape if the WTO would have been
107. Id. at 1-5416-17, 96, 97, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 327.
108. Id. at 1-5418, 103, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 327-28.
109. Id. at 1-5406, 60, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 319.
110. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228(3), O.J. C 224/1, at 77 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 714.
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concluded in its entirety under Article 113 of the EC Treaty, pro-
vide for qualified majority voting as does Article 113.
The difference in scope between external powers and inter-
nal powers, i.e., the situation that would result if in the external
sphere a matter would come under EC powers, while in the in-
ternal sphere similar matters would remain under Member
States' power, is an issue that other legal systems also face."'
The issue can be resolved by means other than interpreting re-
strictively the external powers, especially in the case of the Com-
munity where the procedure for negotiating and concluding in-
ternational agreements protects the interests of individual Mem-
ber States much more than similar procedures in most federal
states protect the interests of states, provinces, and cantons.
One of the major underlying concerns of some Member
States is that interpreting broadly or extending the EC external
relations powers would correspondingly alter the balance of
powers between the Community and the Member States in the
internal sphere. Some Member States fear that in the EC legal
system an action of the Community in the external sphere be-
yond the limits of the ERTA doctrine would lead to a "reverse
ERTA effect."11 2 It is doubtful that under the EC constitution
and constitutional practice as they stand, the exercise by the
Community of external powers for a given subject necessarily re-
sults in Member States losing their powers to deal with that sub-
ject matter in the internal sphere. This loss need not be the
case. It would suffice to provide that the Community's external
powers are without prejudice to the powers of EC Member States
in the internal sphere.
The current ECJ case law relates to opposite situations, i.e.,
where the exercise by the Community of its powers in the inter-
nal sphere leads to a corresponding loss of Member States' pow-
ers in the external sphere. Moreover, there are contrary indica-
tions in ECJ case law. In Opinion 1/94, with respect to trade in
goods, the ECJ distinguished between the external and the inter-
nal sphere. The ECJ took the view that the WTO Agreement on
111. See, for example, the description of the position in Australia, Canada, Swit-
zerland, and the United States in Les Etatsftdiraux dans les relations internationales, XVII
REVUE BELGE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1983).
112. Alan Dashwood, Why Continue to Have Mixed Agreements at All?, in LA CoM-
MUNAUTt EUROPEkENE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES. QUELLES PERSPECTIVES, supra note 64, at 96.
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Agriculture113 could be concluded under Article 113 of the EC
Treaty and be implemented in the internal sphere under Article
43 of the EC Treaty.114 The distinction is not necessarily or
solely a question of legal basis. This distinction also has to do
with the division of powers between the Community and Mem-
ber States.
In Opinion 1/94, again the Netherlands claimed that the
Community did not have the power to conclude the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 113, on
the grounds that certain EC directives in that area were optional
and that complete harmonization in that area had not been
achieved and was not contemplated. 5 The ECJ took the posi-
tion that the provisions of this agreement "are designed merely
to ensure that technical regulations and standards and proce-
dures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations
and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade" and thus, fall "within the ambit of the common
commercial policy."1 6 The ECJ did not say that the Netherlands
was wrong when describing the current situation in the internal
sphere. Nor did the ECJ say that the division of powers in the
internal sphere necessarily parallels the division of powers in the
external sphere and conversely, as the Netherlands appeared to
assume. Thus, it implied that the Community could have powers
in the external sphere over a given matter, i.e., technical regula-
tions and standards, to the extent necessary to avoid obstacles to
international trade, while the same matter remained under
Member State powers in the internal sphere.
In addition, the "parallilisme des compitences" theory,117 which
assumes that the Community's external powers are somehow an
appendix of its powers in the internal sphere, is no longer justi-
fied as a general proposition. The EC system has evolved in im-
portant ways. There was a time when common commercial pol-
icy, at the EC level was seen only as the necessary complement of
113. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 48,
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994).
114. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5397-98, 29, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 313.
115. Id. at 1-5398, 32, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 314.
116. Id. at 1-5398, 33, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. at 314.
117. Jean Groux, Le ParalMlisme des Compitences Internes et Externes de la Communautd
Economique Europienne, 14 CAHmERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 3 (1978).
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the customs union, 118 without which this customs union could
not work properly. Similarly, there was a time when the only
rationale for implicit EC external powers was to prevent the un-
doing in the external sphere of what had been done in the inter-
nal sphere. Currently, similar considerations are no longer the
only purpose and reason of EC action in the external sphere.
Today, EC action in the external sphere may be justified simply
as the best way to defend the Member States' interests and citi-
zens. This development was in fact recognized in the previous
intergovernmental conference, even though an amendment to
the EEC Treaty to that effect' 19 was not accepted because there
was no unanimous agreement on it.
The Zeitgeist is not the only explanation for the low ebb
reached in Opinion 1/94. Thirteen years ago, Thijmen Koop-
mans already announced a return to minimalism and
prophesied that in the future the ECJ's willingness to construct a
solid legal basis on its own initiative might diminish. 2 ° In addi-
tion, on the issues with major constitutional implications raised
in the request for an advisory opinion, the ECJ was faced with
the views of the Commission and with opposing views put for-
ward by the European Parliament, i.e., the branch of the legisla-
ture directly representing EC citizens, by the Council, i.e., the
other branch of the legislature, and by eight of the then twelve
Member States that still exercise the constitutional powers in the
Community. This conflict occurred precisely at a time when the
Intergovernmental Conference was launched to review the EC
constitution.
One can only speculate, but it does not appear improbable
that at this particular juncture the ECJ preferred to leave it to
the collective wisdom of the Member States, reviewing the EC
constitution to draw conclusions from the development of the
case law, to bring some order in the ad hoc and piece-meal way in
which the Community's external powers were organized, and to
118. Or more widely of the "Common Market," as the external face of the internal
market. EECKHOUT, supra note 82, at 23-24.
119. See the lead-in of Article 228 of the EEC Treaty proposed by the Luxembourg
presidency, "Si des accords avec un ou plusieurs Etats tiers ou organisations internation-
ales doivent 9tre n6goci~s dans des domaines couverts par le pr6sent Trait." AGENCE
EUROPE, May 3, 1991, at 15.
120. Thijmen Koopmans, The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration, 35
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 925, 931 (1986).
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draw some conclusions from the de facto larger responsibilities
that Member States are entrusting to the Community.
In the EC system, as in other systems, there is a dialectic
between legislative and regulatory activity and judge-made law
that is occasionally also at work on the constitutional level. The
direct effect and supremacy doctrines of the ECJ are included in
the acquis communautaire to which the Acts of Accession of new
Member States, which are instruments of a constitutional charac-
ter, refer. The case law of the various EC commerce clauses, in
particular Article 30,121 the broad interpretation of which can be
partly explained by the relative inaction of the EC legislative
branch, has led to the so-called new legislative approach towards
harmonization of legislation focusing on mutual recognition
and reliance of private standardizing bodies. This development,
in turn, probably explains in part the reversal of the ECJ's inter-
pretation of Article 30 in Keck and Mithouard.,12 2 It is, at any rate,
noteworthy that the ECJ's interpretation of Article 113 as exclud-
ing trade in services and trade related intellectual property
rights and its tightening of the ERTA and Opinion 1/76 doc-
trines have been followed by the inclusion by the Intergovern-
mental Conference of these subjects matters in the scope of the
foreign trade policy powers, albeit under a condition precedent
of a unanimous vote in the Council.
121. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 30, O.J. C 224/1, at 15, (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 602.
122. Keck and Mithouard, Joined Cases C-267-268/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-6097, 1-
6131, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 101, 124-25.
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